Abstract-When wireless sensors are deployed to monitor the working or life conditions of people, the data collected and processed by these sensors may reveal privacy of people. The actual content of sensory data should be concealed to preserve the privacy, but the data concealment feature may be abused by compromised sensors to modify or ill-process data without being caught. Hence, reconciling privacy preservation and intrusion detection, which apparently conflict with each other, is important. This paper studies this problem in the context of sensory data aggregation, a fundamental primitive for efficient operation of sensor networks. A scheme is proposed that can detect illperformed aggregation without knowing the actual content of sensory data, and therefore allow sensory data to be kept concealed. The results show that, the actual content of raw and aggregated sensory data can be well concealed. Meanwhile, most of ill-performed aggregations can be detected; the ill-performed aggregations that can escape from being detected have only negligible impact on the final aggregation results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensors are more and more widely deployed to monitor the working or life conditions of people. As the data collected and processed by these sensors may reveal privacy of people, for example, their daily life patterns or health condition, it is desired to conceal the actual content of the data for privacy preservation. The data concealment feature, however, may be abused by compromised sensors to modify or ill-process data without being caught. Hence, reconciling privacy preservation and intrusion detection, which apparently conflict with each other, is important. This paper studies the above problem in the context of sensory data aggregation [1] - [3] , which has been one of the fundamental primitives necessary for efficient operation of sensor networks. With this primitive, each sensor aggregates the data generated by its own and that it receives, and forwards only the aggregated result. This way, the amount of data communicated in the network can be significantly reduced, which consequently decreases bandwidth consumption and energy depletion. If some sensors are compromised, they may ill-perform data aggregation to distort the aggregation result. Chan et al. [2] and Yang et al. [4] have proposed intrusion detection schemes to identify ill-performed aggregations. But these schemes do not attempt to conceal the content of sensory data and thus do not preserve the privacy of people whom the sensory data is associated with. On the other hand, Castelluccia et al. [5] , He et al. [6] and others [7] - [10] have proposed sensory data concealment schemes to preserve the privacy of people who or whose environments have been monitored by sensors. But these schemes cannot detect ill-performed aggregations. To the best of our knowledge, no effective scheme has been designed to simultaneously accomplish data concealment and detection of ill-performed aggregations.
The major barrier in simultaneous accomplishment of data concealment and detection of ill-performed aggregations is that, existing detection schemes [2] , [4] need to know the actual content of data that is aggregated and the aggregated result to find out if the aggregation is performed correctly, which disables the employment of existing data concealment schemes [5] - [10] , and vice versa. To eliminate the barrier, we propose a scheme that can detect ill-performed aggregations without knowing the actual content of data that is aggregated or the actual aggregation result, and therefore allow data to be kept concealed. The proposed scheme is designed on top of a generic framework for data aggregation [8] , [10] . Assuming a tree structure is used for sensory data collection, mathematical constructs are delicately devised to enable every non-leaf sensor in the tree to test if its descendant nodes have ill-performed aggregation based on the reports received from these descendants. The reports transmitted in the tree can be concealed (i.e., the actual content of the report is perturbed) and thus are unknown to the detecting sensors.
The results show that, the actual content of raw and aggregated sensory data that are transmitted in the network can be well concealed and thus the goal of privacy preservation is accomplished. Meanwhile, most of ill-performed aggregations can be detected; the ill-performed aggregations that have escaped from detection have only negligible impact on the final aggregation results.
In the following, Section II describes the system model. Section III provides preliminaries. Section IV elaborates the proposed scheme. Sections V reports the results of simulation. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Aligned with existing work on sensory data aggregation [2] , [4] , [6] , [8] , the following assumptions are made: A sensor network consists of a sink and N static sensors, where each sensor has a unique ID picked from {1, · · · , N } and the ID of the sink is 0. Each sensor monitors its direct environment, generates sensory data and responses to queries from the sink. The sink is aware of the deployed network topology, and has powerful computation, storage and communication capabilities compared to sensors. Each sensory data item is an integer ranging from 0 to some upper bound denoted as U d . Note that, even though some data (e.g., temperature, humidity, noisiness, etc.) may not be integers in its original form, they can be converted to integers. As in a typical data aggregation protocol, a tree rooted at the sink is formed by connecting sensors and the sink [2] , [4] . The sink broadcasts each query via the tree downwards, and sensors forward their replies back to the sink via the tree upwards. During the course of forwarding replies, each non-leaf sensor aggregates its own data with the data from its children, and only forwards the aggregation result to its parent. We assume each sensor u knows how many descendants it has, which is denoted as N u .
We assume a relatively static network topology as privacy critical applications are often deployed inside a building where people's activities are monitored. Note that, the topology of the data aggregation tree may change due to node or link failures. We assume these failures can be detected and the sink is aware of them. And the failed nodes can further be replaced manually due to the indoor deployment of the network. Furthermore, a reliable transmission mechanism is assumed to be adopted as in [2] , [4] , [6] , [8] .
We assume the sink is trustworthy while any sensor could be compromised. As our study focuses on data concealment and detection of ill-performed data, only the following attacks are mainly considered: (i) outsiders or compromised sensors eavesdrop packets in transmission; and (ii) compromised sensors modify aggregation results, and attempt to make the sink accept the false aggregation results (i.e., ill-performed aggregation). We do not consider the attack in which a compromised node forges its own sensory data. As pointed out by [2] , [4] , the final aggregation results will not drift far away from the true results if compromised sensors can only forge their own data.
III. PRELIMINARIES
For different statistics queried by the sink, there are different data aggregation algorithms. To make our solution generic, we build our solution on top of a generic data aggregation framework, i.e., the histogram-based framework [8] . In this section, the histogram-based framework is first presented, which is followed by the scheme for data concealment on top of the framework and attacks on the scheme.
A. Histogram-based Framework for Data Aggregation
The valid range of sensory data, i.e., [0, U d ], is uniformly divided into a certain number (denoted as n) of buckets. Given a query requested by the sink, assume the actual sensory data that should be reported by a sensor u is denoted as d u , and d u falls into the i th bucket (i.e., ⌊ du U d /n ⌋ = i).
• If sensor u is a leaf node, it sends to its parent n-tuple
and for every j = i, D u,j = 0.
• If sensor u is not a leaf node, it first collects reports from all of its children, denoted as
After collecting and aggregating histograms reported by its children, the sink can approximately compute the sum, average, max/min, median, standard deviation, etc. of all the sensory data generated in the network. For example, assuming the resulting histogram is D 0,0 , · · · , D 0,n−1 , the median of all the sensory data can be approximated as
Note that, the actual median value must be in the range of [k
n , i.e., the obtained median value, and the actual median value is not greater than
To ease presentation, hereafter we treat a n-tuple
bj , where b = ⌈log 2 N ⌉ and N is the total number of nodes in the network.
B. Data Concealment in Histogram-based Aggregation
A scheme to conceal the actual content of data on top of the histogram-based aggregation framework has been proposed [8] , which is briefly described as follows.
To conceal the actual content of data, instead of reporting original histogram D u as described in Section III-A, sensor u reportsD u , whereD u = D u + P u mod q, and q = 2 bn . Here, P u is a node-specific secret number computed as
where each p u,j = h(K u |X|j) mod 2 b , K u is a secret key shared between node u and the sink, X is the nonce uniquely associated with current query, and h(.) is the secure one-way hash function.
After the sink has aggregated histograms from all of its children and obtainsD 0 , the original histogram for all sensory data in the network (still denoted as D 0 ) can be computed as
C. Ill-performed Data Aggregation
With the data concealment scheme, histograms transmitted in network are perturbed and thus become unintelligible to everyone but the sink. A compromised node may take advantage of this fact by not conducting aggregation honestly and such abuse of data concealment cannot be caught. This problem is to be addressed in our proposed scheme.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME

A. High-level Ideas of Our Design
On top of the generic histogram-based data aggregation framework, we aim to propose a scheme that enables nonleaf sensors to check if their descendants have ill-performed aggregation though the detecting sensors do not know the actual histograms which should be concealed. The scheme is designed based on the following ideas.
1) Perturbation for Data Concealment: As in [8] , each sensor shares a unique secret key with the sink. A unique nonce is disseminated along with a query from the sink. Responding to the query, each sensor reports a histogram which is added by a perturbation number determined together by its unique secret key and the unique nonce of the query. The perturbation is unknown by anyone other than the reporting sensor and the sink, and it is not reused. The perturbation mechanism conceals the actual histograms and thus conceals the actual sensory data.
2) Leveraging Unique Properties of Histogram Data Structure for Detecting Ill-performed Aggregations:
Responding to each query, each sensor generates one and only one data item which falls into one and only one bucket of the histogram. Therefore, for any non-leaf sensor u, supposing the number of its descendants is N u and each of its children sends up an aggregated histogram, it can obtain an aggregated histogram which is the sum of all the received histograms, and the aggregated histogram should satisfy the following necessary conditions if its descendants have not ill-performed aggregations:
• Necessary Condition 1. The sum of the numbers in all buckets of the aggregated histogram should be N u .
• Necessary Condition 2. The number in each bucket of the aggregated histogram should be no less than 0 and no greater than N u .
These two necessary conditions are leveraged to check aggregation integrity. As these two are necessary conditions, it does not guarantee that there is no ill-performed aggregation if the conditions are both satisfied. However, as shown by the evaluation results in Section V, using these two conditions can detect most of ill-performed aggregations, and the impact of undetected ones is highly limited.
B. Detailed Description of Our Proposed Scheme
The detailed description of our proposed scheme is broken down to four parts, namely, system initialization, query launched at the sink, response at sensors, and response processing at the sink.
1) System Initialization: For a sensor network with N sensors, we use b = ⌈log 2 N ⌉+1 bits to record the number of sensory readings in each bucket. Recall that, previous approaches use ⌈log 2 N ⌉ bits. We introduce one more bit to provide larger range of perturbations for better data concealment. Based on n and b, a finite field F q (q = 2 n * b = 2 n * (⌈log 2 N ⌉+1) ) is constructed.
The sink prepares t nonces, denoted as X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X t , where X i is used in the i-th query, and no nonce is reused. For each sensor u and for each nonce X i , the sink computes sensor u's perturbation number P i u as a large number in F q as follows:
where p u,j = h(K u |X i |j) mod 2 b , K u is a secret key exclusively shared between sensor u and the sink, and h(.) is a one way secure hash function.
Based on the known aggregation tree, the sink also computes for each non-leaf sensor u the sum of perturbation numbers used by all of its descendants, which is denoted as S 
• For each bucket j belonging to the rest n − m − m ′ buckets, the value of w i u,j is arbitrarily chosen such that 0 < w
To summarize, for each i ∈ {1, · · · , t}, each sensor u is loaded with
•S i u : the perturbed sum of the perturbation numbers that will be used by all the descendants of sensor u during the i-th query (note: if sensor u is leaf node,S i u = 0)
2) Query Launched at the Sink:
For the i-th query, the sink sends out a query message containing nonce X i .
3) Responses by Sensor u to the i-th Query: Upon receiving the query message containing nonce X i , each sensor u prepares its sensory reading D u , computes the perturbation P u used for current round, computes its own perturbed datã D u = (D u + P u ) mod q, and replies the query differently depending on whether it is a leaf node or not:
• If sensor u is a leaf node, it only reports its individual perturbed data A u =D u to its parent. Note that, its actual histogram report D u has been concealed by the secret perturbation P u , which is only known by sensor u itself and the sink.
• If sensor u is a non-leaf node, it waits until it has received reply A vj from every child v j , where j = 0, · · · , m u − 1 and m u is the number of children of sensor u. Then, sensor u checks if its descendants have ill-performed aggregations. The checking procedure is shown by Algorithm 1. If no ill-performed aggregation is detected, sensor u aggregates its own perturbed dataD u with the sum of received perturbed data (i.e., R u ), and sends the sum of these two parts, i.e., A u = (R u +D u ) mod q, to its parent.
Algorithm 1 Detection of Ill-performed Aggregation (Run by
Non-leaf Sensor u):
No ill-performed aggregation is detected 7: else 8: Ill-performed aggregation is detected; sink is notified 
else 9: Ill-performed aggregation detected in subtree rooted at v j 10: Compute final histogram H 0 = vj ∈Ψ H Γv j
C. Probabilistic Version of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme described in Section IV-B requires every non-leaf sensor u stores S i u ,W i u for every query i, and takes part in detection for every query. This may require too much storage overhead. To reduce storage cost, for each query i, each sensor u is preloaded with X i ,S i u ,W i u with probability p, which is called its detection participation probability or participation probability for short. Sensor u takes part in detection for i-th query with nonce X i only when it has been preloaded with detection knowledge S i u ,W i u . In the following simulation evaluation, we assume the probabilistic version of the proposed scheme is adopted, and study its performance as the participation probability p varies.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH SIMULATION
A. Experiment Setup
The proposed scheme is simulated to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of detecting ill-performed aggregation. We simulate a sensor network with 400 sensors distributed over a 1000 × 1000m 2 field. We assume that valid sensory data is in range {0, · · · , 99}. By default, the number of buckets is 10, and the system parameters m and m ′ are 1 and 2, respectively. But these parameters vary in the simulations studying their impacts. In the figures of simulation results, each plotted value is an average over 100 simulation runs with the same set of system parameters.
B. Performance Metric
We introduce the metric of detection probability to measure the probability that the proposed scheme successfully detects an ill-performed aggregation. Particularly, it is measured as the number of rounds which detects the attack over the overall number of rounds in our experiment, where in each round at least one attack is simulated.
We also define a series of percentage of deviation for commonly used aggregation functions to measure the impact of attack when the attack is not detected. Specifically, let f and f ′ be the final aggregation result based on the actual histogram and the histogram obtained by the sink, respectively, for an aggregation function (e.g., sum/average, median, standard deviation, and max/min). The percentage of deviation is measured as
C. Attack Models
Compromised sensors are randomly selected from non-leaf nodes. Each of them adds or subtracts δ at one or multiple buckets of the correct histogram that it is supposed to compute and send to its parent. Here, δ is a random number in [1, ρ * N ), ρ is a system parameter called change scale, and N is the number of nodes in the network. Particularly, we identify the following attack model:
Sensor u randomly selects r buckets, namely, k 1 , · · · , k r , and adds δ ki to bucket k i , where 1 ≤ δ ki ≤ δ and r i=1 δ ki = δ. In the next step, sensor u randomly selects r ′ buckets, which are different from the previous r buckets, and subtracts δ k ′ i from these r ′ buckets, where
The above attack models are specified based on the following observation: to avoid being detected via Line 6 of Algorithm 2, the adversary needs add δ at one or multiple buckets, meanwhile subtract δ from other buckets. However, it is highly possible to cause a borrowing when substraction is performed. The adversary does not have effective strategies to prevent borrowing from happening because the distribution of sensory readings from its subtree is unknown to the adversary.
Unless otherwise stated, we set the percentage of bad nodes to 10%.
D. Performance Evaluation 1) Detection Probability vs. Participation Probability:
Considering the storage overhead, each sensor node is preloaded with information to check the data integrity attacks with certain probability. Recall that, we called it participation probability. Fig. 1 shows how the participation probability affects the detection probability. Generally, the higher is the participation probability, the higher detection probability is achieved. However, when the change scale ρ is larger than 3%, dishonest aggregation can be detected even if the participation probability is as low as 5%. Hence, we set the participation probability to 5% by default in the rest of simulation. 2) Impact of Undetected Attacks: From Fig. 1 , we can see that the detection probability is not close to 1 when the change scale is less than 2%. We hence study the impact of undetected attacks on the aggregation results obtained by the sink. Fig. 2 shows the results. As we can see, the undetected attacks barely change the results of max/min aggregation function. The percentages of deviation for aggregation functions sum/average, median and standard deviation are also quite small. Therefore, the impact of undetected attacks is tolerable for these common aggregation functions since the aggregation results do not deviate far away from the actual results.
3) Detection Performance vs. Percentage of Compromised Nodes: Fig. 3 shows the detection probability as the percentage of compromised nodes varies. As for other parameters, the change scale is 1% and the participation probability is 5%. As we can see, it becomes easier to detect ill-performed aggregation as the percentage of compromised nodes increases.
On the other hand, if no ill-performed aggregation is detected, the deviation between the obtained aggregation results and the actual ones keeps at a very low level even when the number of compromised nodes increases. Particularly, the percentage of deviation is less than 7% in the worse case when the percentage of compromised nodes is no greater than 30%. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the problem of reconciling privacy preservation and intrusion detection in sensory data aggregation. A scheme is proposed to detect ill-performed aggregation without knowing the actual content of data aggregated or the actual aggregation result, and therefore sensory data can be kept concealed. The simulation results show that, the goals of data concealment and detection of ill-performed aggregations can be accomplished simultaneously, and the proposed scheme is effective to address this problem.
